Of these decisions, the Constitutional Court singles out the following:
AP-587/21 (V.Š.) –The appellant contested the judgments rendered in the criminal proceedings conducted against the appellant, wherein the appellant was found guilty of the criminal offence of abuse of office or official authority and criminal offence of associating for the purpose of perpetrating criminal offences in concurrence with the continued criminal offence. The appellant was finally sentenced to two years and one month in prison. During the proceedings, the appellant complained that there was not an approval of the competent authority for her criminal prosecution and referred to her right to immunity. The Constitutional Court concluded that there were contradictions in the reasons for the decisions of the ordinary courts as to whether the appellant had invoked immunity or not. Given that, the Constitutional Court held that the reasons given in the contested decisions of the ordinary courts did not meet the standards of a “reasoned decision” in so far as the appellant’s right to immunity was concerned, thereby violating the appellant’s right to a fair trial under Article II(3)(e) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 6(1) of the European Convention.
AP-745/21 ("Koudijs Animal Nutrition B.V." The Netherlands) – The appellant contested the ordinary courts’ decisions wherein the appellant’s lawsuit seeking the court to order the defendant (“Agrocentar“ d.o.o. Obudovac) to pay debt was rejected. The ordinary court gave reasons that the court in Republika Srpska did not have jurisdiction to deal with the appellant’s lawsuit. Having referred to the case law of the European Court in the judgment of Zubac v. Croatia, the Constitutional Court examined whether the appellant had been denied the right of access to court in the proceedings at issue. In this connection, the Constitutional Court found that the ordinary courts had clearly stated evidence base on which it was established that the appellant and the defendant had agreed the jurisdiction of the District Court in Arnhem (The Netherlands) and law of The Netherlands as applicable law in case of a dispute. Furthermore, the ordinary courts linked the established fact to Article 16 of the RS Civil Procedure Code and Article 49 of the Law Resolution of Conflict of Laws with Regulations of Other Countries as relevant provisions for adopting a decision in the case in question. Given clear and sufficient reasons given in the contested decisions, the Constitutional Court concluded that the limitation of the appellant's right of access to court was legitimate and proportionate to the aim pursued and did not impair the essence of the appellant’s right of access to a court. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court emphasized that the appellant continued to have an opportunity of filing a lawsuit to a court to determine the jurisdiction on which the litigants agreed upon, thereby protecting its civil rights. Finally, the Constitutional Court found that there had been no violation of the appellant’s right to a fair trial insofar as other segments thereof were concerned.
AP-882/21 (V. P.) – The appellant contested the judgement of the County Court in Banjaluka, wherein the first-instance judgment was modified and the appellant’s claim seeking the court to order the defendant to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage allegedly resulting from defamation was dismissed. Given the fact that the County Court stated that the reason for granting the appeal was the fact that the defendants had transmitted information that had been previously published in the media, the Constitutional Court could not deal with the issues of whether the disputed expression contained facts or value judgements, whether the disputed expression contributed to a debate of public interest, whether the defendants had acted in good faith and whether they had checked the information or with other relevant issue related to the freedom of expression. The Constitutional Court found that the substance of the appellant’s claim related to the protection of the right to reputation under Article II(3)(f) of the Constitution of BiH and Article 8 of the European Convention, and it examined the appellant’s allegations in compliance of the standards related to the examination of that right. Having applied the standards of the European Court and Constitutional Court that relate to the transmission of information, the Constitutional Court concluded that the disputed information had not been published by other media and public information services, and therefore, on this basis, the defendants could not be exempted from liability for defamation. The Constitutional Court found that, given such circumstances, the interference with the appellant’s right to private life was not “prescribed by law”, and that the appellant’s right under Article II(3)(f) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 8 of the European Convention had been violated.
AP-1030/21 (B.P.) – The appellant contested the judgment of the Supreme Court of the FBiH, which finally dismissed the appellant's lawsuit against the administrative authority's decision to suspend the appellant’s right to the payment of the old-age pension based on the relevant provisions of the Law on Pension and Disability Insurance of the Federation of BiH (“the Law on PDI“) because he re-acquired the status as an insuree of the compulsory insurance. The Constitutional Court, having applied the three-part test, found that interference with the appellant's right to property was lawful and pursued a legitimate aim – consistent implementation of the law provisions and the protection of the principle of legal certainty. However, having referred to its decision no. AP-582/21, the Constitutional Court concluded that the interference was disproportionate because it resulted in the full suspension of the appellant’s right to the old-age pension in the period starting from the entry into force of the Law on PDI to the date of publication of the judgement of the FBiH Constitutional Court no. U-36/18. In that way, the appellant as an individual was forced to bear an excessive and disproportionate burden resulting from the application of the provisions of the Law on PDI, which was subsequently declared inconsistent with the FBiH Constitution. The Constitutional Court noted that the situation could have been different if the appellant had been obliged to bear a reasonable and proportionate reduction of his pension, and not a full suspension of his right, or if there had been a transitional period during which he would have adapted to the modification of legal regulations. The Constitutional Court further noted that the FBiH Constitutional Court, following the adoption of the contested decision of the Supreme Court, took another judgement no. U-20/22, wherein it answered the constitutional question of application and effects of the decisions of the FBiH Constitutional Court on the pending court proceedings. According to the view taken by the FBiH Constitutional Court, the judgement of the FBiH Constitutional Court, wherein the disputed provisions of the Law on PDI was declared unconstitutional, was applicable to the appellant's case because it was published pending the dispute at issue. In this connection, the Constitutional Court emphasized that at the moment when the contested decision had been taken, the court could not have been aware of the view taken by the FBiH Constitutional Court. However, the Constitutional Court contends that the court should have taken into account the fact that the disputed law provision was declared unconstitutional in the context of direct application of the European Convention, as stipulated under Articles II(2) and II(6) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it failed to do. The Constitutional Court therefore found that the appellant's right to property had been violated.
AP-1646/21 (F.M.) - The Constitutional Court granted the appeal and found a violation of the appellant's right to a home under Article II(3)(f) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 8 of the European Convention in the procedure for issuing and enforcing the warrant issued by the Municipal Court in Bihać. Namely, the Municipal Court, at the request of the competent Cantonal inspection administration (due to the alleged performance of an activity for which the appellant does not have the permit of the competent authority), pursuant to Articles 67 and 72 of the Criminal Procedure Code, issued the contested warrant ordering the search of residential and ancillary facilities owned by the appellant. The contested warrant named three cantonal inspectors of the Cantonal Administration who would search the appellant's facility, with the assistance of authorized officials of the Ministry of the Interior. Based on the disputed warrant, the competent Cantonal Administration carried out an “inspection” of the residential building owned by the appellant and a “record of inspection” was drawn up on the same day, which was then submitted to the competent Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office. After that, the competent Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office issued an order not to conduct an investigation regarding the aforementioned search.
The Constitutional Court primarily assessed the lawfulness of the search - interference with the appellant’s right to a home in the context of the obligation to provide adequate and effective measures of protection against any abuse and arbitrariness in light of the standards established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court. For the Constitutional Court, it was indisputable that, in terms of the relevant provisions of the CPC and the Law on Cantonal Inspections, cantonal inspectors are not “authorized officials” in charge of conducting a search as an action taken in investigative proceedings. It was emphasized that the function of criminal prosecution is assigned by the law exclusively to prosecutor, that is, authorized officials whom the prosecutor authorizes to carry out an investigative action, which is the action of search in the present case. Therefore, it was concluded that Article 67(2) of the CPC, on the basis of which the contested search warrant was issued, does not apply to cantonal inspectors as civil servants. It was also established that the police officers present did not conduct a search of the appellant's "home", but rather "assisted" in the sense of providing assistance in carrying out inspection supervision within the meaning of Article 117 of the Law on Inspections. In addition, it was established that in the procedure for executing the contested warrant, no action was taken in accordance with Article 74 (4) of the CPC, since the presence of two adult citizens was not ensured during the search. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the issuance of the contested warrant actually resulted in a combination of two completely different powers of police officers within the meaning of the Law on Inspections and the CPC and that the Municipal Court actually “mixed” the mechanisms from both laws in order to ensure the effective application of Article 71(3)(f) of the Law on Inspections. Bearing in mind the above, it was concluded that the contested warrant and the search action were the result of multiple acts of non-compliance with the imperative norms prescribed by the CPC, which is why the criterion of interference “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 8 of the European Convention was not met in the present case. Given the conclusion on the (un)lawfulness of the interference with the appellant’s right to home, the Constitutional Court did not examine whether there was the existence of a legitimate aim and the necessity of the interference within the meaning of Article 8 of the European Convention.
AP-4567/23 - (Radio Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina – BHRT) – The appeals challenged the final judgments of the Supreme Court rejecting the revisions against the lower-instance judgments rejecting the claims of Radio Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BHRT) requesting that RTRS pay it the corresponding compensation for the collected RTV fees in the Republika Srpska. The courts concluded that the public RTV system envisaged by the Law on the Public RTV System has never been fully implemented because the Public RTV Services Corporation was not established, nor did the System Board function as a supervisory body for the collection and distribution of the fee. On this basis, the courts concluded that the appellant was not entitled to demand payment of funds directly from the defendant and that she did not have standing to file a lawsuit. However, the Constitutional Court found that the contested judgments did not satisfy the principle of proportionality because a fair balance between the public interest and the protection of the appellant's right to property has not been struck. The Constitutional Court emphasized that the appellant could not have been imposed an excessive burden due to the non-functioning of the System Board and the failure of the Corporation to start functioning. It also emphasized that the defendant did not have the legal right to retain the entire amount of the RTV fee. In view of the above, the Constitutional Court indicated that only in a situation where the System Board had fulfilled its legal obligations and the defendant had fulfilled its legal obligation and had paid the total amount of the collected RTV fee into a single account, the interpretation of the ordinary courts could have been that the appellant and the defendant are not in any substantive legal relationship Therefore, it was concluded that there has been a violation of the appellant's right to property. Therefore, the judgments of the Supreme Court were quashed and the cases were referred for a new decision.
AP-3687/24 - (D.S. and S.S.) - The appeal filed against the challenged judgment of the County Court was dismissed due to the violation of the right to a fair trial under Article II(3)(e) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the European Convention. The Constitutional Court applied the standards of the European Court for deciding on the allegations relating to the operation of that court as a court of "fourth instance" from the case of Ašćerić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina. It concluded that the challenged decisions provided sufficient reasons that in the present case the legal conditions for full adoption of the adoptee under Article 157 of the Family Law were not met. In this regard, the Constitutional Court pointed out that it follows from the provision of Article 157 of the Family Law that the consent of the parents to their child being fully adopted is necessary for full adoption. However, the Constitutional Court notes that the provision of Article 152 of the Family Law, which was also referred to by the County Court, implies that the consent of the parent who has been deprived of legal capacity is not required for incomplete adoption. Bearing in mind the aforementioned provision, the Constitutional Court does not consider as arbitrary the County Court’s finding that “if the legislator had wished to stipulate the possibility of full adoption of the child whose parents are deprived of parental right or legal capacity, the legislator would have expressly stipulated it”. In relation to the allegations in the appeal that the interests of the adoptee were not taken into account in the contested decisions, in accordance with the provisions of the Family Law and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Constitutional Court notes that the Ministry clearly indicated in its decision that the Centre's decision lacks an explanation as to why full adoption is in the best interest of the adoptee. In addition, the Constitutional Court noted that the appellants in their appeal do not state why in this specific case it is in the best interest of the adoptee to be fully adopted, or why the best interests of the adoptee cannot be achieved through incomplete adoption. The Constitutional Court notes that an incomplete adoption does not require the consent of a parent who has been deprived of legal capacity, as in the present case. Having regard to the above, the Constitutional Court could not conclude that the County Court's decision was arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, nor that the interests of the adoptee were neglected and that the Convention on the Rights of the Child was arbitrarily interpreted, as the appellants allege.